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The Fall of Management Accounting 
The NIRA and the Homogenization of Cost Practices in the U.S. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper explores the impact of societal trends on cost practices, and the 
management techniques used to support business structures, within the United 
States. Specifically, the influence of the National Industrial Recovery Act [NIRA] on 
the development of the costing and pricing policies is explored from the perspective 
of social rule system theory. The premise of the paper is that the NIRA, as enforced 
through the symbol of the "Blue Eagle" displaced the free market economy in the 
United States.  This resulted in a pseudo-competitive market structure where full cost 
recovery and the earning of a fair and reasonable profit became the basis for market 
pricing and business management. The displacement of the competitive market by 
the NIRA is argued to account for the apparent loss of relevance in modern costing 
theory and practice during the mid- to latter part of the twentieth century.  It is also 
contended that these practices may have enhanced the shocks to the U.S. economic 
associated with the global marketplace. The paper concludes by suggesting that 
relevant management accounting theory has to be reconstructed within a competitive 
market framework that reflects key drivers of competitive advantage. 
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The Fall of Management Accounting 
The NIRA and the Homogenization of Cost Practices in the U.S. 
 
 
  The last two decades of the twentieth century witnessed an intense dialogue surrounding 
the relevance of current management accounting and control systems.  There has also 
been a plethora of suggestions made about how best to "fix" these ailing systems 
(Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; Cooper, 1989; Johnson, 1992; Shank and Govindarajan, 
1993; Noreen, et.al., 1995). Throughout this dialogue, the focus has been on how to adapt 
accounting-based calculative practices to better provide the type of information needed 
by companies competing in the global marketplace. The economic impact of 
globalization provides the backdrop for the urgency and thrust of the messages delivered 
by these "new accountants." Unless changes are made to our "accountings", they argue, 
the future will be bleak indeed. 
  
  It is clear the world that accounting serves is undergoing significant changes.  The rapid 
decline of major industries (e.g., steel, electronics, and automobiles), the displacement of 
major segments of the working population, and the loss of competitive power caused by 
the onslaught of foreign competition are just a few of the powerful forces reshaping 
business practices in the U.S.  The radical upheaval in the American market that has 
followed on the heels of developing global markets harkens back to an earlier time of 
crisis in U.S. economic history: the Great Depression of 1929. Both of these events 
represent significant shifts in the economic stature and health of the United States. It will 
be argued here that these two periods are linked in many ways. Specifically, it will be 
suggested that the market rules (formal and informal) set down in response to the 
economic crisis of the Depression may have set the stage for the apparent failure of the 
American economy to rapidly adapt to the demands of the global market. 
 
  To develop this argument, the paper explores the history of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act [NIRA] including its de facto continuance through an informal social 
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mechanism (the Blue Eagle) and subsequent war-based price stabilization boards.1  
Having presented the historical framework of the research, the paper then examines the 
overall impact these combined forces may have had on the laissez-faire capitalistic 
structure that lay at the heart of the market mechanism formed in the U.S. during its early 
history. Using the logic of social rule system theory (Burns and Flam, 1987a, 1987b; 
Burns, 1986), and the phrases and thoughts from original source documents from the 
period of the "New Deal" and the NIRA, this paper will explore the displacement of the 
competitive market, and the consequent abandonment of economically sound theories of 
cost, that this macro-economic movement entailed. 
 
  By providing a historically- and economically-based analysis and explanation for the 
proliferation of full cost recovery practices, and the subsequent abandonment of 
economic, or market-driven, theories of cost, this paper stands to make a major 
contribution to our understanding of the historical development of management 
accounting and control practices. This enhanced understanding may support a 
constructive dialogue about the underlying assumptions, and implications, of the full cost 
recovery model and its potential for hampering the competitiveness of American 
companies in the global economy. 
 
The Depression and New Deal: A System Rule Theory Perspective 
  Social rule theory focuses on the development of markets as defined by the context, or 
cultures, in which they emerge (see Figure 1). This growing body of literature explores 
the socio-political processes relating to the maintenance and change of markets and 
related rule regimes (Burns and Flam, 1987a). According to social rule theory, market 
rule formation can occur through legal and administrative acts created and implemented 
through political and government processes, by the collusion of groups of sellers and/or 
buyers who establish rules of market entry and rules for procedures and transactions, by 
the influence of norms, including informal rules, that are supported by a status group, and 
                                                          
1 Two primary price control boards were used in the United States during the 1941-1953 period.  The Office of Price 
Administration (OPA) was in existence from 1941-1945 as part of the President’s emergency war powers.  The OPA 
was in all key practices and procedures a continuance of the NIRA.  During the Korean War a similar form of 
legislation, the OPS (Office of Price Stabilization) again imposed significant aspects of the NIRA on the American 
economy.   
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through the granting of credit and access to contracts within the economic system. As 
noted by Burns and Flam (1987a), such market rules affect transaction costs as well as 
imply that there will be the potential for increased prices due to the impact of these social  
rule-based agreements on the supply and demand relationships within a market. 
 
  At the heart of the argument that market relationships can be shaped by social rules 
rather than economics is the belief that "markets are social organizations, structured and 
regulated by more or less well-defined social rule systems" (Burns and Flam, 1987a: 
125). Burns and Flam go on to suggest that there are two basic ways that this market 
organization may be brought about (Burns and Flam, 1987a: 127): 
1. Strategic structuring, informal or formal, whereby social agents, including 
the state, establish a rule regime regulating market access and 
transactions. 
 
2. Emergent structuring, whereby participants discover or adopt certain similar 
strategies within bounded rationality and situations with certain 
opportunity structures and incentive structures. Social network and 
ecological properties result in relatively well-defined aggregate 
performance characteristics. 
 
Social rule theory, then, provides a useful framework for analyzing the development of 
markets, as well as providing insights into the forces that can bring about changes in the 
social structuring, or rule systems, that govern their functioning (see Figure 1). 
[Insert Figure 1 about here.] 
Social Rule System Theory and the Creation of Markets in the United States 
  A laissez-faire free market structure is one of the defining features of the capitalistic 
model developed and used to frame transactions within the United States during its early 
years (Brand, 1988). Prothro (1954), writing about this period, emphasizes that this 
formative period in the American economy was characterized by traditional business 
concerns with economic liberty and the preservation of private property, without a hint of 
any orientation toward, or desire for, increased business-government relations. Consistent 
with the "rugged individualism" that defined the developing social structure of the United 
States, the American marketplace and the businesses that comprised it were left to 
function with minimal interference from outside forces. 
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  The resulting "neo-classical" market model (Baker, 1984) within the U.S. was built 
upon a minimal set of market rules, open micro-networks and undifferentiated 
macro-networks of buyers and sellers as the basis of its structuration. Facing minimal 
transaction costs and situational constraints, such a neo-classical market is depicted as 
one of "hyper-rationality" that is based on the tacit agreement of rule-abiding participants 
for its functioning (Baker, 1984). In other words, within the neo-classical structure, there 
is no reason to expect standardization in costing or accounting practices, unless such 
standardization supports the efforts of the micro-networks of buyers and sellers in 
reducing their market transaction costs (Burns and Flam, 1987a, 1987b; Burns, 1984). 
 
  At the heart of the cost debate was a belief that customers would not pay a company for 
its waste.  This theme—the need to separate productive cost from various forms of 
waste—led to a heated debate on the proper treatment of the cost of idleness in 1919.  
What is of interest to this research effort is not the topic of idle capacity cost, but rather 
the  fact that “cost” as a construct appears to serve a central role in management decision-
making and analysis.  In other words, the various forms of cost accounting that existed 
during the early 1900s, and the management practices that they supported, were driven by 
the need for information to make decisions within the organization, not by government or 
professionally-defined accounting rules. Cost was perceived as a concrete representation 
of economic reality. 
 
Market Structuration and the NIRA 
  By 1933, the United States was in the fourth year of the most serious economic 
depression it had ever faced. As suggested by Lyon, et.al. (1935), it is this crisis that led 
to the election, and installation, of a new Administration that was skeptical of the rugged 
individualism of the past and convinced that a greater degree of collective action was the 
solution the ailing economy needed. The term "New Deal" became the hallmark phrase 
denoting the policies, rules, regulations, and sanctions that were to reshape the market 
structure of the United States. 
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  One of the central pieces of legislation of the "New Deal" was the National Industrial 
Recovery Act, or NIRA. The NIRA targeted the perceived "predatory competition" of the 
pre-Depression era that was argued by Roosevelt and his followers to be the major cause 
of this market failure (Johnson, 1935: 160). Coupled with an increasing concern for the 
advancing "rationalization" of American industry between 1922 and 1929 (e.g., the 
displacement of men by machinery; Lyon, et. al., 1935: 6), a defensible basis for 
redefining the rules of the marketplace was defined. The result was an attack on free 
market competition, the perceived causal factor in the economic collapse. 
 
  The NIRA was the backbone of this anti-free market movement, representing a visible 
and direct development of rules to reshape the market economy (Brand, 1988; Lyon, 
et.al., 1935; Johnson, 1935). One of the main enforcing mechanisms of the NIRA, as 
defined and structured by Hugh Johnson, its director, was the development of a broad 
number of cost protection codes. In all, 352 separate code items dealing with the concept 
of "cost" were developed during the two short years the NIRA functioned (Lyon, et.al., 
1935).  
 
  Developing uniform costing practices, then, served as the backbone of the NIRA's attack 
on the perceived inadequacies of the free market structure. And it was not simply any 
form of costing which was to serve this purpose--it was full cost recovery that became the 
"accepted" means of measuring, and hence setting prices on the basis of, incurred costs. 
The implications of this change in the role, and method, of costing was clearly noted and 
understood by those shaping the economy as detailed by Lyon, et.al. (1935: 588): 
 
“It is highly probable that in every instance in which the NRA guaranteed 
cost protection to industries it was expected that such protection would 
bring about a price higher than the competitive price. It is needless to say, 
therefore, that it is in effect price fixing. Unless the cost systems, the use 
of which was required by individuals, included elements of cost that were 
not being earned (emphasis added), there would be no demand on the 
part of industries for such provisions. The precise extent to which 
no-sales-below-individual-cost provisions bring prices above competitive 
prices depends in part upon the elements included in costs ...An analysis of 
the first 16 accounting systems approved indicates that in each cost system 
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elements of "cost" specified not only direct labor and material costs, but a 
large proportion of indirect manufacturing expenses .....” 
 
  It would appear that within the formation and functioning of the NIRA, full cost 
recovery practices were to play a pivotal role in redefining the competitive market place. 
As such, then, the NIRA appears to provide a potential explanation for the apparently 
radical, and troubling, shift away from a rich, economics-based theory of costing, as 
detailed and promoted by Church (1930), Gantt (1915), and Clark (1923), toward the 
modern accounting-centered system. It was a change designed, not to improve business 
performance, but rather to radically change the structure of the laissez-faire free market 
system that was the foundation of the American economy. 
 
Reforming the Market: The Blue Eagle Takes Off 
  At this point it is important to acknowledge the transitory nature of the NIRA. Signed 
into "law" as a temporary action in June of 1933, the NIRA was terminated in 1935 on 
the heels of a series of legal and legislative battles that brought its constitutionality 
directly into question, as suggested by the following: "The NIRA was declared 
unconstitutional as an excessive delegation of law-making power to private groups and 
government agencies" (Lowi, 1971: 75). Cut short by the Supreme Court's decision in the 
United States v. Schechter Poultry Corporation, the NIRA faced growing resistance from 
big-business during 1934 and 1935, and was ultimately abandoned (Brand, 1988). 
 
  To the casual observer of the period, then, the NIRA is a transitory blip in the operation 
of the free market that had some interesting cost implications. The framers of the NIRA, 
though, were not so naive in their attempts to reshape the economy. While the formal 
legislative structure of the NIRA was dismantled, it was not the only way the Act, and its 
intentions, were enforced. Specifically, the development of the National Recovery 
Administration (the administrative arm of the NIRA) by Hugh Johnson was framed 
around the use of a symbol: The Blue Eagle. It is the Blue Eagle, and its ongoing use 
throughout the period leading up to and immediately after World War II that provides the 
second, and perhaps most interesting, part of the unfolding drama. 
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  Burns and Flam (1987a) make a point of stating that unwritten rules and informal norms 
are one way that rule regimes can pursue the active shaping of supply and demand curves 
through the active determination of, or interference with, market prices. In other words, it 
appears possible that the influence of the NIRA on both the market, and the costing 
practices which defined it, may have remained in force through the operation of an 
informal set of rules that were conveyed through the Blue Eagle symbol.  
 
Business and New Deal Economics 
  Pulling the threads of the argument together, it appears that the Blue Eagle provides a 
mechanism for the continued influence of the NIRA beyond 1935, including its pursuit of 
uniform costing methods as embodied in full cost recovery. To gain acceptance from 
business, though, the increased costs of doing business inherent in the New Deal 
legislation had to pass through to the public in the form of price increases that effectively 
moved prices above the competitive market level. In order to create acceptance of the 
NIRA by business, companies were allowed to pursue a "reasonable profit" based of full 
cost recovery of both "earned" and "unearned" costs (Lyon, et.al., 1935). In other words, 
in agreeing to abide by the NIRA, and to signal this adherence through display of the 
Blue Eagle, business was awarded with a guaranteed profit, or return, on all of its costs, 
whether value-adding or not. 
 
  The implicit agreement to overturn the market as the basis for price setting, replacing it 
with a full cost recovery plus "reasonable profit" mode of operation, is the essential 
element of the NIRA and its impact on the extant market economy of pre-1933 America. 
As noted throughout the texts of the period, the goal of the NIRA was to define the 
concept of "fair" competition, and to weed out the predators that were charged with the 
destruction of the economy. In essence, the businesses who prescribed to the NIRA, and 
its symbol (the Blue Eagle) agreed to disengage from the market-based pricing 
mechanisms that formed the basis of the neoclassical, laissez faire, form of market 
competition, replacing it with a "full cost plus reasonable profit" price mechanism. Cost 
accounting practices played a constituent role in shaping the New Deal economy and its 
pseudo-competitive market structure. 
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  By tacitly agreeing to compete on a cost-based definition of market value, or price, 
business was creating a safety net for itself that would effectively remove it from the 
harsh realities of the free market system. The redefinition of price to reflect full cost 
recovery plus "reasonable profit" on the basis of full cost provided business with a means 
to stabilize and improve its financial performance. In its early phases, then, the NIRA was 
supported by business because business itself stood to benefit. 
 
The Blue Eagle, Full Costing, and Its Implications 
  The key to the reforms driven by the NIRA was the intense desire to get people back to 
work (Slichter, 1934; Richberg, 1934; Johnson, 1935). This can hardly be faulted as a 
reasonable goal given the dire straits the American economy found itself in. Hooked to 
the various efforts to increase both employment and wages e.g., the Works Progress 
Administration, the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and a large 
number of public works, the New Deal's attack on the free market system was 
consistently driven by the belief that the essence of a fair, and sustainable, market 
economy lay in the full employment of all citizens. People were desperate for work, and 
businesses were desperate for consumers with the funds necessary to purchase their 
goods. It was not a time for lofty ideals; it was a time for action (Johnson, 1935; 
Richberg, 1934). 
 
  Yet, the Blue Eagle, and the cost-based, pseudo-competitive market structure that 
emerges from this period had several troubling implications. The first of these is most 
effectively captured by simply reprinting a cartoon found in Johnson's autobiography 
(Johnson, 1935: 229; see Figure 2]. As can be seen, Hugh Johnson is depicted as 
removing feathers from the American Eagle in order to create the Blue Eagle. There is no 
more striking evidence of the underlying intent of these self-appointed architects of the 
New Deal economy. 
[Figure 2 about here.] 
  Herein, then, lies the primary issue and concern represented by the NIRA and its 
"enforcer," the Blue Eagle: They appear to have sought to undo the democratic state. This 
may seem like an overstatement of the facts presented so far, but the juxtaposition of the 
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NIRA, the concept of "rugged individualism," and laissez-faire capitalism, the dominant 
social rule system of the United States preceding the New Deal, was consciously made by 
Johnson. A cost-based, and governmentally-defined, economic structure was the solution 
sought, and effectively implemented, through the NIRA and the Blue Eagle. 
 
  Full cost recovery accounting methods played a major role in this quest to reshape the 
overall nature of American social and economic structures (Lyon, et.al., 1935; Johnson, 
1935). This non-market based costing model became the basis for competition, for the 
definition of "market price", and the definition of value-added, and waste, within the 
post-Depression economy. As long as all industrialists agreed to adhere to this costing 
ideal, which in fact it was in their self-interest to do, the economic order would be 
restored and all would benefit. This was the underlying logic that drove the New Deal 
proponents. As Roosevelt stated, "the NIRA was to restructure the economy for all time." 
And perhaps it might have, had the United States been able to avoid, or defend itself, 
against the onslaught of the global marketplace. 
 
The Fall of Management Accounting 
  The NIRA and the Blue Eagle have been argued to represent an intentional form of 
restructuring of the American economic system away from laissez faire, or free market 
capitalism, to a more general political economic model (Burns and Flam, 1987a,b) 
premised on government interference in markets. Reinforcing these formal policies was 
the adoption of informal norms that suggested that full cost recovery become the basis for 
setting "fair" market prices (Lyon, et.al, 1935; Johnson, 1935). In this process, the rich 
history of economics-based costing, which argued that the market equilibrium price 
would not accommodate excessive levels of cost or waste, appears to have fallen into 
disuse. And, as suggested, it may have resulted in an almost religious adherence to full 
cost recovery-based pricing and its assurance that a company will earn a reasonable 
profit. As such, the NIRA and the Blue Eagle appear to result in a major market 
fracturing and reconstruction of the guiding social rule system within the United States 
economy. 
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  This argument suggests a logical explanation for the apparent mass amnesia that 
surrounds management accounting today. Specifically, the rich history of dialogue 
surrounding the economics of cost that defined the pre-1933 world of accounting would 
appear to have no ultimate demand, or purpose, in a market system that defines 
competitive price as what a company spends plus a fair return. Such a mass amnesia, or 
ignorance argument, though, is normally troubling. What is missing in a mass ignorance 
argument is motive and force. In exploring the accounting literature in the twentieth 
century, the marked fissure in the literature is striking. It is clear that the existence of 
some powerful, all-encompassing force is necessary to explain why the wisdom of writers 
such as Church (1930), Gantt (1915) and Clark (1923) falls into disuse, and ultimately, 
disappears from modern management accounting literature. 
 
  Many have argued that the SEC Acts of 1933 and 1934 were responsible for this decline 
in management accounting (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987), yet a careful reading of these 
Acts betrays no global prescription for "full cost recovery." Only the NIRA, which 
specifically promoted, and relied upon, the logic of full cost recovery in its framing and 
operation appears to provide a reasonable explanation for this major change in the role, 
and definition of, relevant management accounting data. In redefining the set of social 
rules that defined the market economy in the United States, Roosevelt, with intent, 
employed full cost accounting methods to define, and stabilize, the pseudo-competitive 
market structure. In linking cost to a new social rule system, Roosevelt created the 
platform for a blind adherence to full cost recovery methods. Yet, as Johnson (1992) 
suggests this apparent "blind adherence" to full cost recovery logic is proving to be a 
handicap in the global marketplace. It is this final issue to which this paper will now turn. 
 
Redefining Management Accounting: A Free Market Perspective 
  Is it not possible that the combination of these events, and the 40 years of history over 
which they transpired, may have led to the apparent loss of knowledge that significant, 
and valuable, alternatives to full cost recovery methods of costing might be usefully 
applied in various business settings (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987)? This series of 
arguments might be seen as a set of unfounded claims, yet it is a common theme that runs 
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throughout current management accounting literature (for instance, Johnson and Kaplan, 
1987; Cooper, 1989; Johnson, 1992; Shank and Govindarajan, 1993). Johnson and 
Kaplan (1987) appear to have made this logic, the perceived "fall" of management 
accounting, the basis for a rebirth of the economic theory of cost. 
 
  Trends within the United States suggest that economic theories of cost appear to be 
undergoing rebirth as one basis for the effective management of competitive business in a 
global market. For instance, target costing (Sakurai, 1989) is an economic model that 
suggests that companies should work from the market in establishing their price, profit, 
and hence allowable cost expectations for a product even before it is launched. Target 
costing is simply one way a company can begin to focus on cost, not as a naturally 
recoverable expense of doing business, but as rather a constraint, or cap, on the perceived 
value of goods and services. In this model, cost is what is sacrificed to gain the market 
price; when such "cost" exceeds the market-determine value of the good or service, a loss 
is sustained. Target costing, then, appears to start from the belief in a free market 
economy with supply and demand curves set by perceived product value, or consumer 
utility functions, rather than from the current "cost" of the resources consumed to create 
that good or service. 
 
  A related recent "innovation" in management accounting, strategic cost management 
(Shank, 1989; Shank and Govindarajan, 1991, 1993) suggests that competitive advantage 
can be gained by redefining the structure of an industry's value chain. Once again, this 
popular approach appears to build from the belief that predatory practices that actually 
seek to disrupt the structure, or existing rule system, of a market represent acceptable, and 
in fact desirable, competitive actions. The entire logic of strategic cost management 
adheres to the description of behavior that would occur in a market characterized by 
having weak moral commitments (Burns and Flam, 1987a). 
 
  It is difficult to make the same argument about activity-based costing (Cooper, 1990; 
Kaplan, 1988), not because its proponents are not equally committed to identifying an 
economic theory of cost that is viable within the free market economy of the global 
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marketplace, but because this model does not as directly divorce itself from the logic of 
full cost recovery. Activity-based approaches reconnect costing theory to the tenets of 
causality, effectively attacking the notion that companies can, and should, recover 
"unearned costs" (Lyon, 1935) in established market prices, yet in the end, they suggest 
that all costs are still to be charged to ongoing production (e.g., full cost recovery). This 
may, in the end, be the critical flaw in activity-based costing. 
 
  As each of the major innovations in management accounting take hold, whether they are 
truly "new" or simply "old wine in new bottles" that date back to pre-Depression theories 
of the economics of cost, they appear to augment the attack on the status quo (e.g., full 
cost recovery approaches). These new methods, consequently, appear likely to meet with 
significant resistance from the existing "enforcers" of the old order, in much the same 
way that the shapers of the NIRA faced bitter attacks from major industrialists and 
economists. It seems that in a "winners take all" battle for the power to dictate the social 
rule system guiding the American economy, either the old or the new model of 
calculative practice must dominate. The only question which remains is which one? 
 
An Eye Toward the Future 
  The objective of this paper has been to trace the historical development of the market 
economy within the United States, suggesting that it has undergone two radical upheavals 
that have effectively redefined the basis for competition. First, the Depression and its key 
act, the NIRA, were suggested to represent a deliberate re-structuration of the laissez faire 
market in a manner consistent with social rule system theory (Burns and Flam, 1987a, b). 
This period is described as a pseudo-competitive market where fair competition is 
defined by full cost recovery with a built-in expectation for a "reasonable profit." It is an 
economic model that is driven, not by the iron laws of the marketplace, but rather by tacit 
agreement on a prescribed set of market rules and norms. 
 
  The second disruption in the American economy is then argued to be driven by the re-
emergence of laissez faire capitalism in the guise of the global market. And, as suggested 
by Burns and Flam (1987a,b), this second disruption appears to have the power to put the 
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U.S. at severe economic risk, as its accepted modes of doing business, and defining 
market practices, fall in the face of competitors who do not abide by these market rules. 
 
  In recasting economic history in this light, the constitutive role, played by 
accounting-based theories of cost, become evident. Specifically, it is argued that full cost 
recovery, which is not an economically-sound basis for competition in a laissez faire free 
market, serves as a primary tool for enforcing the rules of the New Deal, or 
pseudo-competitive, market. Ultimately, this very tool of market structuration appears to 
hinder the responsiveness of the American economy to the changing rule structures 
embedded in the global economy. It is this disabling influence that may account for the 
increasingly heated attacks on accounting as the basis for the competitive decline of 
American industry (Johnson, 1992; Goldratt and Cox, 1993). 
 
  The path forward for business, and the accounting systems which support them, appears 
to lie in rediscovering the essence of the economic theory of costs which drove Henry 
Ford to constantly search for ways to eliminate waste, and that motivated Church (1930) 
to discuss capacity as the productive capability of an organization to create value in the 
market place. This economically-motivated approach to costing theory appears to be the 
basis for such innovations as target costing, product life cycle costing, and strategic cost 
management. As such, there appears to be a logic for, and demand for, the rebirth of 
management accounting theory, a rebirth that reattaches the accounting profession to the 
logic of the market. 
 
  In the end, this paper will have accomplished its purpose if it merely moves the dialogue 
surrounding costing to one that more accurately places accounting developments within 
their historical and social contexts. In a search for the "root cause" for the decline of 
management accounting, this paper, then, represents one potential explanation for the 
mass amnesia that appears to be at the heart of the fall of management accounting. 
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General Model of Market Structuration  
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